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Abstract
I survey the literature on monetary policy at the zero lower bound (ZLB) and
eﬀective lower bound (ELB) to make three main points: First, the Federal Re-
serve’s forward guidance and large-scale asset purchases are eﬀective monetary
policy tools at the Z/ELB. Second, during the 2008–15 U.S. ZLB period, the
Fed was not very constrained in its ability to inﬂuence medium- and longer-term
interest rates and the economy. Third, the risks of the Fed being signiﬁcantly
constrained by the ELB in the future are typically greatly overstated. I conclude
that the Federal Reserve is not very constrained by the lower bound on nominal
interest rates.
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This paper was prepared for a panel discussion on “Monetary Policy at the Eﬀective Lower Bound” at
the Fall 2018 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity Conference. I thank Jan Eberly and Jim Stock
for inviting me to participate. The views expressed in this paper, and all errors and omissions, are my
own and are not necessarily those of the individuals or groups listed above.
11. Introduction
In December 2008, the Federal Reserve lowered the federal funds rate to essentially zero, where
it remained until December 2015. Because U.S. currency carries an interest rate of zero, it’s
essentially impossible for the Fed to set the federal funds rate substantially below zero without
triggering widespread conversion of deposits into currency. This constraint is commonly referred
to as the “zero lower bound” (ZLB), or “eﬀective lower bound” (ELB) to acknowledge that the
bound may be somewhat negative rather than literally zero.
The existence of the Z/ELB has led many authors to conclude that it imposes a substantial
constraint on the Fed’s ability to conduct monetary policy in a low interest rate environment
(e.g., Krugman, 1998; Williams, 2009; Kiley and Roberts, 2017). In this paper, I survey the
recent literature to demonstrate exactly the opposite: that the Z/ELB has not been and is not
a signiﬁcant constraint on the Federal Reserve, either in the past or the future. This conclusion
follows from three main observations: First, the Federal Reserve’s forward guidance and large-
scale asset purchases (LSAPs) are eﬀective monetary policy tools at the Z/ELB, in fact, about as
eﬀective as the federal funds rate in normal times. Second, during the 2008–15 U.S. ZLB period,
the Fed was not very constrained in its ability to aﬀect medium- and longer-term interest rates
and the economy. Third, the risks of the Fed being signiﬁcantly constrained by the ELB in the
future are typically greatly overstated.
2. The Fed Has Additional Monetary Policy Tools Available
The ﬁrst main observation is that the Federal Reserve has other monetary policy tools available to
it beyond just changes in the current federal funds rate. In particular, there is a large and growing
literature on the eﬀectiveness of forward guidance—communication by the Federal Reserve about
the likely future path of the federal funds rate over the next several quarters—and large-scale
asset purchases, or LSAPs—purchases by the Federal Reserve of hundreds of billions of dollars of
longer-term U.S. Treasury bonds and mortgage-backed securities.
Theoretically, ﬁnancial markets and ﬁrms are forward-looking, so ﬁrms’ investment decisions
depend not just on the current short-term interest rate, but also on the path of expected future
short-term interest rates over the next several years. A simple way to formalize this observation
is a standard New Keynesian IS curve,
yˆt = Etyˆt+1 − αrˆt + εt (1)
2which can be solved forward, assuming limj→∞ Etyˆt+j = 0, to get
yˆt = −αEt
∞∑
j=0
rˆt+j + εt, (2)
where t indexes periods, yˆt is the output gap, rˆt the deviation of the one-period real interest rate
from steady state, Et denotes the mathematical expectation conditional on information at time t,
and εt is a mean-zero shock. The inﬁnite sum in equation (2) illustrates how the Fed can aﬀect
the current output gap by changing people’s expectations about the future path of rˆt+j as well as
the current value of rˆt itself. Reifschneider and Williams (2000) and Eggertsson and Woodford
(2003) use this fact to show that, even at the ZLB, the Fed can still stimulate the economy as
long as it can credibly commit to a lower path of short-term interest rates in the future, when
the ZLB is no longer binding.
Empirically, Gu¨rkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005, henceforth GSS) showed that changes
in the federal funds rate alone were not suﬃcient to explain ﬁnancial market reactions to Federal
Reserve Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) announcements, and that there was a second
dimension of monetary policy that was being missed. GSS developed a measure of forward
guidance based on high-frequency changes in a range of federal funds futures contracts around
FOMC announcements, orthogonalized to the change in the current federal funds rate. They
showed that forward guidance had highly statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects on ﬁnancial markets
and dramatically increased the explanatory power of FOMC announcements for ﬁnancial market
responses. GSS also showed that large movements in their measure of forward guidance were
associated with FOMC statements about the future path of the federal funds rate. Their results
demonstrated that forward guidance is eﬀective, and have since been updated and conﬁrmed for
the U.S. and other countries by Brand, Buncic, and Turunen (2010), D’Amico and Farka (2011),
Campbell et al. (2012), Leombroni et al. (2017), Swanson (2018), and others.
An equally large and growing literature ﬁnds that the Fed’s LSAPs had economically and
statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects on longer-term bond yields. These analyses range from high-fre-
quency event studies of the U.S. (e.g., Gagnon et al., 2011; Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen,
2011) and U.K. (e.g., Joyce et al., 2011) to historical studies of “Operation Twist” in 1961
(Swanson, 2011) to lower-frequency, monthly studies of U.S. Treasury yields and spreads vis-a-vis
Treasury supply from 1919–2008 (Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2012) to monthly no-
arbitrage term structure models with quantity eﬀects (Greenwood and Vayanos, 2012; Hamilton
and Wu, 2012). Swanson (2011) and Williams (2013) survey these estimates, but a common
3Table 1: Estimated Effects of Changes in the Federal Funds Rate,
Forward Guidance, and LSAPs on Financial Markets, 1991–2015
Treasury yields Baa S&P
2-year 5-year 10-year yield 500 $/yen
change in federal funds rate 3.68∗∗∗ 2.04∗∗∗ 0.95∗∗∗ 0.56 −0.30∗∗∗ −0.13∗∗∗
[ t-stat.] [13.91] [8.56] [3.74] [1.51] [−6.98] [−3.04]
change in forward guidance 4.85∗∗∗ 5.09∗∗∗ 3.92∗∗∗ 1.99∗∗∗ −0.19∗∗∗ −0.18∗∗∗
[ t-stat.] [5.87] [5.49] [5.04] [3.96] [−3.92] [−3.71]
change in LSAPs −0.32 −3.71∗∗∗ −5.68∗∗∗ −4.22∗∗∗ 0.04 0.25∗∗∗
[ t-stat.] [−1.01] [−6.49] [−7.17] [−5.59] [0.76] [3.97]
Coeﬃcients β from regressions Δyt = α + ˜Ftβ + εt, where t indexes FOMC announcements, y denotes
a given bond yield or log asset price, ˜F the monetary policy factors estimated in Swanson (2018), and
Δ the change in a 30-minute window bracketing each FOMC announcement (1-day window for Baa
yield). Coeﬃcients are in units of basis points (for bond yields) or percentage points (for stock prices and
exchange rates) per standard deviation change in monetary policy instrument. Bootstrapped t-statistics
in square brackets; ∗∗∗ denotes statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level. See text and Swanson (2018) for
details.
benchmark is that $600 billion of LSAPs cause the 10-year Treasury yield to fall about 15 basis
points (bp).
Swanson (2018) estimates the eﬀects of both forward guidance and LSAP announcements
on ﬁnancial markets and ﬁnds that they are roughly as eﬀective as changes in the federal funds
rate in normal times. Table 1 summarizes the results.1 The ﬁrst four columns report the eﬀects
of changes in the federal funds rate, forward guidance, and LSAPs on 2-, 5-, and 10-year Treasury
yields and Moody’s index of Baa-rated corporate bond yields, in units of basis points per standard
deviation change in the policy instrument.2 Thus, the eﬀect of a one-standard-deviation increase
in the federal funds rate is about 3.7bp on the 2-year Treasury yield; for forward guidance, the
eﬀect on the 2-year yield is bigger, about 4.9bp per standard deviation change; and for LSAPs,
the eﬀect is smaller, about −0.3bp, and not statistically signiﬁcant. LSAPs primarily aﬀect longer
maturities and the federal funds rate shorter maturities, but overall the three policies have eﬀects
on yields that are broadly comparable in magnitude. This is further supported by the last two
1Some authors, such as Campbell et al. (2012), distinguish between two types of forward guidance announce-
ments by the Fed—those that convey information about the economy vs. those that only convey information
about monetary policy. Swanson (2018) does not try to separately identify these two types of forward guidance
announcements, so the estimates in Table 1 represent an average forward guidance announcement eﬀect.
2The standard deviation of surprise changes in the federal funds rate is 8.8bp, measured over the period from
1991–2008; the standard deviation of surprise changes in forward guidance is 6bp in the one-year-ahead expected
federal funds rate, as measured by eurodollar futures from 1991–2015; and the standard deviation of a surprise
LSAP announcement is about $250 billion of long-term bond purchases, measured over the period from 2009–15.
See Swanson (2018) for details.
4columns of Table 1, which report the eﬀects on the S&P 500 and the dollar/yen exchange rate, in
units of percentage points per standard deviation change in each policy instrument. The eﬀects of
all three policies have the signs one would expect—higher interest rates imply lower stock prices
and dollar appreciation—and are roughly comparable in magnitude. These results all suggest
that forward guidance and LSAPs are eﬀective monetary policy tools; in fact, about as eﬀective
as changes in the federal funds rate in normal times.
Looking beyond asset prices, some authors have used detailed bank-level data to show that
LSAPs have signiﬁcant eﬀects on bank lending. Rodnyansky and Darmouni (2017) show, via a
diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences analysis of quarterly U.S. bank-level data, that banks that owned more
LSAP-eligible mortgage-backed securities (MBS) increased business lending in response to the
Fed’s LSAPs. Di Maggio, Kermani, and Palmer (2016) apply a similar diﬀ-in-diﬀ analysis to
monthly loan-level U.S. mortgage originations to show that conforming (eligible for purchase by
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac) mortgage originations increased in response to the Fed’s LSAPs.3
Koetter, Podlich, and Wedow (2017) analyze quarterly German bank-level, security-by-security
data to show, via diﬀ-in-diﬀ, that German banks that held more eligible securities for the Euro-
pean Central Bank’s Securities Markets Programme (SMP) increased lending in response to the
program. Thus, the eﬀects of LSAPs extend beyond just a high-frequency change in ﬁnancial
market prices.
Some authors have argued that, even though LSAPs had a signiﬁcant eﬀect on ﬁnancial
markets on impact, those eﬀects tended to die out over time (e.g., Greenlaw et al., 2018). The
monthly and quarterly bank-lending studies above provide evidence against this view—after all,
if the ﬁnancial market eﬀects rapidly died out, why would banks increase their lending over
subsequent months and quarters? Swanson (2018) also studies the persistence of ﬁnancial market
responses to LSAP announcements and ﬁnds that they were very persistent, with the exception
of the very large and perhaps special “QE1” announcement on March 18, 2009. On that date,
bond yields fell dramatically in response to the FOMC announcement, but then began to rise over
subsequent weeks as the Dow gained over 1,000 points and the Fed’s bank stress tests, released
May 7, 2009, turned out better than markets expected; thus, the markets’ behavior in those weeks
may not be representative of the longer-run eﬀects of LSAPs more generally. Figure 1 reproduces
two charts from Swanson (2018) that show a tendency for the eﬀects of LSAPs to die out when the
3To be precise, Rodyansky and Darmouni (2017) and Di Maggio et al. (2016) ﬁnd that the Fed’s LSAP purchases
of MBS had a signiﬁcant eﬀect on bank lending; the Fed’s purchases of long-term Treasury securities during the
“QE2” program did not seem to have such an eﬀect.
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Effect of LSAPs on 10-Year Treasury Yield (excl. 3/18/09)
Figure 1. Estimated eﬀects of LSAPs on 10-year zero-coupon Treasury yields, for diﬀerent horizons h
from 1 to 120 business days, including and excluding the inﬂuential March 18, 2009, “QE1” announcement.
Estimated coeﬃcients γˆh (solid blue line) and bootstrapped±1.96-standard-error bands (dashed red lines)
are from regressions yt−1+h − yt−1 = γh ˜Ft + ε(h)t . Restricted coeﬃcient estimates γh = ae−b(h−1) (dash-
dotted black lines) are from the same set of regressions estimated jointly via nonlinear least squares. See
text and Swanson (2018) for details.
March 18, 2009, observation is included (left-hand panel), but not when that one very inﬂuential
announcement is excluded (right-hand panel).
To sum up thus far, there is a great deal of evidence that both forward guidance and LSAPs
are eﬀective monetary policy tools, in fact about as eﬀective as changes in the federal funds rate
in normal times. There is also very strong evidence that LSAPs aﬀected bank lending. Although
some have argued that the eﬀects of LSAPs are not persistent, that view seems to be driven
by one very inﬂuential FOMC announcement on March 18, 2009, which may have been special
for a number of reasons. Excluding that one announcement, the estimated eﬀects of LSAPs on
ﬁnancial markets were essentially completely persistent.
3. The Fed Was Not Very Constrained by the ZLB in 2008–15
The second main observation is that, during the 2008–15 ZLB period, the Federal Reserve was not
very constrained in its ability to aﬀect medium- and longer-term interest rates and the economy.
A quick way to see this is in Figure 2, which plots the federal funds rate and 1-, 2-, 5-, and 10-year
zero-coupon Treasury yields from 2007–17.4 Although the federal funds rate is virtually zero and
4Zero-coupon yields are from the Gu¨rkaynak, Sack, and Wright (2007) dataset, available from the Federal
Reserve Board’s web site.
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Figure 2. Federal funds rate and 1-, 2-, 5-, and 10-year zero-coupon Treasury yields from 2007 to 2018.
See text for details.
never changes from December 2008 to November 2015, the 2-year Treasury yield—which is a
better measure of the overall stance of monetary policy, as can be seen in equation (2)—averages
about 55bp during this period and ﬂuctuates substantially over time, ranging between 16bp and
140bp and moving up or down every day in response to macroeconomic data releases, FOMC
announcements, and other news.
Swanson and Williams (2014) formalize this point by estimating how responsive the 2-year
and other Treasury yields are to major macroeconomic announcements, relative to a benchmark
sample from 1990–2000 when the ZLB was not a constraint. That is, they run daily-frequency
regressions of the form
Δyt = γ
τ + δτβXt + εt, (3)
where t indexes business days, Δyt is the one-day change in the 2-year Treasury yield (or other
yield), Xt is an n-dimensional vector of major macroeconomic data releases that day (such as
nonfarm payrolls, CPI, GDP, etc.), β is an n-dimensional vector of parameters containing the
normal responsiveness of the 2-year Treasury yield to each of those releases, and the parameters
γτ and δτ are scalars that vary over time, with δτ normalized to unit mean over the baseline sample
7Figure 3. Time-varying sensitivity coeﬃcients δτ from regression (3) applied to 2-year (left panel) and
5-year (right panel) Treasury yields. Dotted gray lines denote heteroskedasiticity-consistent ±2-standard-
error bands , δτ = 1 corresponds to normal Treasury sensitivity to news, δτ = 0 to complete insensitivity.
Light yellow shaded regions denote δτ signiﬁcantly less than 1; darker red shaded regions denote δτ
signiﬁcantly less than 1 and not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0. See text and Swanson and Williams (2014)
for details.
from 1990–2000.5 Thus, the scalar δτ captures the overall sensitivity of the 2-year Treasury yield
to major macroeconomic announcements around a given date, with δτ = 1 corresponding to
normal sensitivitiy to news and δτ = 0 to complete insensitivity to news.
Figure 3 plots the time-varying sensitivity coeﬃcients δτ from regression (3) for the 2-
and 5-year Treasury yields from 2001–15. The solid blue line in each panel plots the estimated
value of δτ on each date τ , while the dotted gray lines depict heteroskedasticity-consistent ±2-
standard-error bands. Horizontal black lines are drawn at 0 and 1 as benchmarks for comparison,
corresponding to the cases of complete insensitivity to news and normal sensitivity, respectively.
Light yellow shaded regions denote periods when the estimated value of δτ is signiﬁcantly less
than unity; in addition, if the hypothesis that δτ = 0 cannot be rejected, then the region is
shaded darker red. Thus, red shaded regions correspond to periods in which the Treasury yield
was essentially insensitive to news, while lighter yellow shaded regions correspond to periods when
the yield was partially—but not completely—unresponsive to news.
5On most days, there is no news about a given macroeconomic statistic; thus, if the ﬁrst column ofX corresponds
to nonfarm payrolls, then that column would be zero on every date t except once per month, when the nonfarm
payrolls data is released. On each nonfarm payrolls announcement date, the ﬁrst column of Xt contains the surprise
component of the announcement—that is, the actual released value of nonfarm payrolls less the median market
expectation from the day before. The scalar parameters γτ and δτ are estimated over rolling 250-business-day
windows, while the vector β is ﬁxed over the whole sample. See Swanson and Williams (2014) for details.
8The left-hand panel of Figure 3 shows that, from 2008–11, the 2-year Treasury yield’s
sensitivity to news was essentially never signiﬁcantly less than normal. From 2011 to mid-2014,
the 2-year yield’s sensitivity did drop below normal, but was still greater than zero, except for
two very brief periods around the end of 2011. Thus, despite the fact that the federal funds
rate (and other short-term interest rates) were completely constrained by the ZLB throughout
2009–15, the 2-year Treasury yield continued to respond substantially to macroeconomic news.
The 5-year Treasury yield, in the right-hand panel, was essentially never constrained by the ZLB
during this period.
Carvalho, Hsu, and Nechio (2016) examine the eﬀects of Federal Reserve communication
on medium- and longer-term interest rates and come to the same conclusion. Those authors use
textual analysis of newspaper articles in Factiva around each FOMC announcement to measure the
perceived change in the Fed’s “hawkishness” or “dovishness”. They run regressions of medium-
and longer-term Treasury yields on this measure of Fed communication, analogous to equation (3)
above. Carvalho et al. (2016) show that their text-based measure of Fed communication had
economically and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀfects on 2-, 5-, and 10-year Treasury yields throughout
the 2008–15 ZLB period, with results that are similar to Swanson and Williams (2014) and
Figure 3, above. Their results provide direct evidence that the Fed was never very constrained in
its ability to move medium- and longer-term interest rates throughout 2008–15.
Additional indirect evidence supporting this conclusion is provided by the macroeconomic
VAR studies of Wu and Xia (2016) and Debortoli, Gal´ı, and Gambetti (2018). Wu and Xia
(2016) use an aﬃne term structure model to estimate a “shadow federal funds rate” during the
ZLB period—that is, a hypothetical negative federal funds rate that summarizes the eﬀects of the
Fed’s unconventional monetary policies on the yield curve at each date. They estimate a VAR on
output, inﬂation, and the shadow federal funds rate from 1960 to 2013, where the shadow federal
funds rate is set equal to the federal funds rate in the pre-ZLB period, and ﬁnd no evidence of
a structural break in the VAR between the pre-ZLB and ZLB periods. They conclude that the
Fed was able to aﬀect the macroeconomy during the ZLB period in much the same way as it did
before, albeit through unconventional rather than conventional monetary policy.
Debortoli et al. (2018) estimate VAR models with time-varying parameters and come to
the same conclusion. They ﬁnd no evidence of a change in the U.S. economy’s responses to a
technology shock or a demand shock in the pre-ZLB and ZLB periods. They also show that their
methods would detect clear evidence of such a change if the economy followed a standard New
9Keynesian model and monetary policy was conducted by a Taylor-type interest rate rule that
faced a ZLB constraint. They conclude that the Fed’s unconventional monetary policies during
the ZLB period were essentially a perfect substitute for changes in the federal funds rate.
Finally, Skaperdas (2017) performs a multi-sector analysis of the U.S. economy from 1970
or 1988 to 2012. He ranks sectors by their interest rate sensitivity in the pre-2008 period, with
sectors like construction, mining, and transportation being the most interest-sensitive and health
care and services the least sensitive. If interest rates were kept artiﬁcially higher than normal by
the ZLB in 2008–15, then interest-rate-sensitive sectors of the economy should have performed
relatively worse than they did following the previous 1990–91 and 2001–03 recessions. Skaperdas
(2017) shows that this was not the case: interest-rate-sensitive sectors performed about as well
after 2007–09 as they did following previous recessions. Like Wu and Xia (2016) and Debortoli
et al. (2018), he concludes that the Fed’s forward guidance and LSAPs during the ZLB period
were able to lower medium- and longer-term interest rates in much the same way as in previous
recessions.
To sum up the results of this section, the Fed was not very constrained in its ability to aﬀect
medium- and longer-term interest rates throughout the ZLB period. Moreover, explicit tests for a
structural break or change in macroeconomic behavior around 2009 fail to ﬁnd any evidence that
the economy behaved diﬀerently during the ZLB period than before, suggesting that the Fed’s
unconventional monetary policies during that period were a close substitute for changes in the
federal funds rate.
4. Risks of Being Constrained by the ELB in the Future Are Overstated
Finally, the risks of the Fed being signiﬁcantly constrained by the eﬀective lower bound (ELB) in
the future are typically greatly overstated. There are three main reasons for this overstatement:
ﬁrst, the federal funds rate must be constrained by the ELB for several quarters, rather than just
one quarter, to have a noticeable eﬀect on the economy; second, central banks in Europe have
demonstrated that the ELB is substantially below zero, at least −0.75 percent and probably a bit
below −1 percent; and third, even in those rare cases when the federal funds rate is at the ELB
for several quarters, the Fed has alternative monetary policy tools available to it, as discussed
above.
Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2011) study the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy in a standard
medium-scale New Keynesian model at the ZLB. They show that when the ZLB constrains the
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short-term interest rate for 8 or 12 quarters, the ﬁscal multiplier is substantially larger than
normal because the standard monetary policy response to the ﬁscal shock is shut down. However,
they also show that when the ZLB binds for only 4 quarters, then the ﬁscal multiplier is not
any larger than normal (Christiano et al., 2011, footnote 11). The intuition for this result is
straightforward: according to equation (2), above, the output gap today is determined by the
entire expected path of the federal funds rate, not just the federal funds rate today. If the federal
funds rate is only constrained by the ZLB for a few periods, then the eﬀect on the sum in (2)
is relatively small, and the eﬀect on the economy is correspondingly small. This helps to clarify
that the ZLB is not a signiﬁcant constraint on the economy unless it binds for several quarters
(e.g., 8 or more).
Additionally, several central banks in Europe have shown that the ELB is substantially less
then zero. In December 2014, the Swiss National Bank lowered the target for its short-term policy
rate to −0.25 percent, followed by an additional cut to −0.75 percent in January 2015, where it
has remained since. In Sweden, the Riksbank lowered its short-term policy rate to −0.1 percent
in February 2015, followed by several additional rate cuts that brought it down to −0.5 percent
in February 2016, where it has remained since. For the euro area, the European Central Bank
reduced the lower end of its policy rate corridor, the deposit facility rate, to −0.1 percent in June
2014, followed by several additional cuts that lowered it to −0.4 percent in March 2016, where it
has remained since; importantly, money market interest rates have traded near the lower end of
the ECB’s corridor throughout this period. In Denmark, the Nationalsbank lowered its deposit
rate to −0.2 percent in July 2012 and eventually reduced it to −0.75 percent in February 2015,
although they have since raised it to −0.65 percent. All of these central banks have maintained
negative policy rates for several years with no widespread conversion of deposits into currency.6
Evidently, the ELB in Europe is substantially below zero, at least −0.75 percent and probably a
bit below −1 percent.
A concern that is sometimes raised regarding negative policy rates is that they might not
pass through to other interest rates in the economy. For retail deposit rates, there is some
evidence that this is the case (e.g., Eggertsson, Juelsrud, and Wold, 2017). However, De Rezende
(2017) ﬁnds no diﬀerence in the pass-through from changes in the Swedish policy rate to Swedish
government bond yields before and after the negative policy rate regime. Turk (2016) shows
6This is especially remarkable given that the ECB oﬀers EUR500 denomination notes and the Swiss National
Bank CHF1000 notes.
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that policy rate cuts in Sweden and Denmark passed through to money market rates and bank
loan interest rates in those countries to the same extent during the negative interest rate regime
as before, and Turk (2016) and Gros et al. (2016) report that banks increased a variety of fees
on retail customers as a substitute for charging those depositors an explicitly negative interest
rate. Demiralp, Eisenschmidt, and Vlassopoulos (2017) analyze quarterly individual euro area
bank balance sheet data and ﬁnd that banks increased lending in response to policy rate cuts in
the negative policy rate regime by at least as much as before.7 Overall, the pass-through from
negative monetary policy rates to other ﬁnancial market rates does not seem to be inhibited by
the policy rate being negative.8
Together, these two observations—that the ELB is signiﬁcantly less than zero and must bind
for 8 quarters or more to have noticeable eﬀects on the economy—imply that previous estimates
of the risks of the Fed facing a signiﬁcant ELB constraint in the future are typically greatly
overstated. For example, Kiley and Roberts (2017) deﬁne the ELB to be 0 percent—a ZLB—and
then simulate a structural model to count the number of quarters in which the federal funds
rate is less than or equal to zero, even if that episode lasts for just one quarter. Reifschneider
and Williams (2000) and Williams (2009) perform calculations very similar to Kiley and Roberts
(2017), albeit with a less pessimistic shock distribution.9 Obviously, these calculations greatly
overstate the number of times the short-term interest rate drops below a more realistic ELB of
−0.75 percent for 8 quarters or more, which is the economically relevant question.
Even in those rare cases when the nominal interest rate does fall that far for that long,
the simple calculations in Williams (2009) and Kiley and Roberts (2017) ignore the existence
of unconventional monetary policies such as forward guidance and LSAPs. As shown in the
previous two sections, there is extensive evidence that these policies are eﬀective and provide a
7To be precise, Demiralp et al. (2017) compare more vs. less retail-deposit-funded banks. They show that
more retail-deposit-funded banks, which are hit harder by negative policy rates, were relatively more likely to
increase lending, reduce reserves, and increase government securities holdings in response to interest rate cuts in
the negative policy rate regime than before.
8A second, related concern regarding negative policy rates is that they might depress bank proﬁtability, which
in turn might reduce bank lending or have other deleterious eﬀects on the economy. However, because retail
deposit rates are less than the policy rate, this argument applies to low positive interest rates just as much as it
applies to negative rates; thus, if the Fed was willing to lower the federal funds rate from 0.75 percent to 0, it
should be essentially just as willing to lower the funds rate into negative territory. In addition, Lopez, Rose, and
Spiegel (2018), Turk (2016), and Gros et al. (2016) ﬁnd no decrease in bank proﬁtability in the negative policy
rate regimes in Europe and Japan, because banks’ increased fee income and capital gains oﬀset their retail deposit
interest expenses.
9Kiley and Roberts (2017) draw shocks from the empirical distribution of shocks to the U.S. economy from
1970 to 2015, which implies that the U.S. will face another ﬁnancial crisis and Great Recession every 40–45 years,
on average.
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close substitute for changes in the federal funds rate.
5. Caveats
Although the observations above are supported by a wide variety of papers, data sets, and meth-
ods, there are still a few caveats to keep in mind.
First, in a very severe ELB scenario, in which the federal funds rate is expected to be at the
lower bound for more than 8 quarters, the eﬀectiveness of forward guidance could become much
lower than in the past. This almost happened in 2012 (see Figure 3), when ﬁnancial markets
expected the ZLB to be a constraint for long enough that the 2-year Treasury yield’s sensitivity
to news fell substantially. In the end, the 2-year yield’s sensitivity never fell to zero, but if
such a severe ELB constraint arose in the future, the 2-year Treasury yield could cease to be a
viable instrument of forward guidance. In principle, the Fed could work around this constraint
by extending its forward guidance to even longer horizons, but in practice the Fed chair may have
diﬃculty committing his or her successor to a given path for the federal funds rate. However,
even in such a dire situation as this, the Fed still has the ability to conduct LSAPs and inﬂuence
ﬁnancial markets and the economy through that channel. As shown in Table 1, above, LSAPs
have eﬀects that are similar in magnitude to those of the federal funds rate and forward guidance,
but operate substantially farther out along the yield curve.
Second, there may be political constraints that make it diﬃcult for the Fed to use LSAPs
and negative interest rates. During the 2008–15 U.S. ZLB period, LSAPs seemed to be poorly
understood by the public and in many cases evoked strong negative reactions, such as being
called “almost treasonous” by Texas Governor Rick Perry.10 And even though the Fed never
used negative interest rates in 2008–15, the idea evokes similarly vehement opposition from many
commercial and investment bankers, presumably due to fears about bank proﬁtability: for ex-
ample, Deutsche Bank CEO John Cryan argued they have “fatal consequences,” Allianz chief
economic adviser Mohamed El-Erian called them an “insane experiment,” Janus Capital ﬁnan-
cial manager Bill Gross said “Capitalism. . . cannot function” with them, Barclays CEO Jes Staley
stated that “they are not helpful,” and BlackRock CEO Larry Fink told shareholders they bring
“potentially dangerous ﬁnancial and economic consequences.”11 Given this opposition, it may
10“Rick Perry: ‘Quantitative Easing Akin to Treason,’ ” The Guardian, Aug. 11, 2011.
11“Deutsche CEO: Negative Rates Have ‘Fatal Consequences’,” CNBC, Aug. 25, 2016, Jeﬀ Cox; “Negative
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be more diﬃcult for the Fed to pursue these policies than the literature surveyed above would
suggest.
6. Conclusions
The Federal Reserve has not been and is not signiﬁcantly constrained by the lower bound on
nominal interest rates, either in the past or the future. This conclusion is supported by three
main observations: First, the Fed’s forward guidance and LSAPs are eﬀective monetary policy
tools, about as eﬀective as changes in the federal funds rate in normal times. Second, during the
2008–15 U.S. ZLB period, the Fed was not very constrained in its ability to aﬀect medium- and
longer-term interest rates and the economy. And third, the risks of the Fed being constrained
by the ELB in the future are typically greatly overstated. These observations are supported
by dozens of papers analyzing a variety of countries and data sets and using a wide variety of
methods, ranging from high-frequency ﬁnancial market responses to no-arbitrage term structure
models to macroeconomic VARs to quarterly bank-level lending data. Although there are a few
caveats to keep in mind, the overall conclusion is robust to these concerns.
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